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The Rights and Remedies of Shareholders in
Closely Held Corporations Under Illinois Law
William R. Quinlan & John F. Kennedy*

I. INTRODUCTION

For several years, Illinois has protected shareholders of closely held
corporations by recognizing them as the virtual legal equivalent of
partners. Operating on the cutting edge of such issues, Illinois law
imposes upon shareholders of closely held corporations the identical
fiduciary duties that partners owe to one another in a partnership
venture.' Each shareholder must treat other shareholders with the
utmost honesty and fairness in all corporate affairs and is prohibited
from engaging in any form of secret dealing. 2 Moreover, because
every shareholder has the right to participate in the management and
control of the corporation, Illinois law prohibits majority shareholders
from depriving minority shareholders of their right to participate
meaningfully in corporate governance, providing them with broad
protections and wide-ranging remedies where those in control of a
corporation act in an oppressive or unlawful manner.3
Both the fiduciary obligations owed by shareholders of close
corporations and the legal and equitable remedies available to those
shareholders arise from the significant distinctions between close
corporations and large public corporations. Close corporations usually

* William R. Quinlan (B.S.C. 1961, J.D. 1964, Loyola University Chicago, LL.M.
1988 University of Virginia School of Law) is a former Justice of the Illinois Appellate
Court and a former Cook County Circuit Court Judge. He is a founding and name partner
in the law firm of Quinlan & Crisham, Ltd. John F. Kennedy (B.A. 1980, Niles College
of Loyola University Chicago; J.D. 1987, DePaul University College of Law) is an
adjunct professor at John Marshall Law School, where he teaches in the Accelerated Trial
Advocacy program. Mr. Kennedy is also a founding partner in the law firm of Quinlan &
Crisham, Ltd. This article is adapted from Mr. Quinlan's presentation at the 1997
Family Business Legal & Financial Advisor Conference held at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law on November 1I, 1997. The authors express profound gratitude
and appreciation to Daniel L. Stanner, Mark L. Durbin, Jennifer K. Dart, and Matt D.
Basil, Quinlan & Crisham associates, who assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part Ill.
3. See infra Part IV.
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have only a few shareholders and are often family-owned. Generally,
these shareholders invest not only money, but also a substantial
amount of time and energy to make the corporation a success. Each
shareholder of the close corporation has a legitimate expectation to
participate in the day-to-day management of the business, to be named
as a corporate officer and director, and to be employed by the
corporation.4 Often, the shareholder's only return on his investment is
the salary the shareholder receives as compensation for a position
within the corporation.
By protecting the expectations of
shareholders, both the Illinois common law and recent amendments to
the Illinois Business Corporation Act are designed to recognize the
commercial realities of the closely held corporation.'
Family business disputes often arise among shareholders that
ultimately result in the business' failure. For example, of the familyowned corporations with at least twenty employees that existed in the
Chicago area in 1924, eighty percent were no longer operating in
1984.6 This failure of closely held corporations can be attributed
mostly to "typical family problems [such I as sibling rivalry [and]
competition between the generations" that result in disputes among
shareholders and problems of corporate succession. 7 Recognizing the
unique problems associated with closely held corporations, Illinois law
provides shareholders of close corporations with both the means to
resolve disputes that arise,8 and mechanisms to avoid those disputes
through advance planning.
This Article illustrates these mechanisms by examining the rights
and duties of shareholders of closely held corporations organized
under Illinois law. The Article will explore the nature of the legal and
equitable relationships of the owners of closely held or family-owned
corporations, common disputes, and ways to avoid or resolve such
disputes. First, the Article discusses the nature of close corporations
and the fiduciary obligations that exist among the shareholders. 9 The
Article then addresses the problems that typically plague closely held
corporations and methods through which owners of small businesses
4. See infra Parts II-III.
5. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West 1997); see also Galler v. Galler, 203
N.E.2d 577 (I1. 1965); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(using common-law principles typically applied to closely-held corporations).
6. See Steven Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the
Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 287 (1990) (citing J. WARD,
KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY xv (1987)).

7. See id.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part II.
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may avoid such problems.'0 Next, the Article will analyze Illinois law
regarding disputes among shareholders, which gives courts great
latitude to fashion remedies to protect the minority shareholders'
investment and rights of control, preserve the assets of the business,
and, if possible, avoid dissolution of the business." Finally, this
Article will suggest the role that legal counsel can play to help the
corporation avoid conflicts and disputes."
II.

CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS UNDER ILLINOIS LAW

In the landmark case Gallerv. Galler,13 the Illinois Supreme Court
defined the closely held corporation as "one in which the stock is held
in a few hands, or in a few families, and wherein it is not at all, or
only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling."' 4 The Illinois legislature
likewise defined a non-public corporation as "a corporation that has no
shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a
market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated
securities association."' 5
Several unique characteristics distinguish closely held corporations
from public corporations.' 6 In addition to involving close family or
other personal relationships, close corporations, unlike publicly traded7
corporations, have no market for the corporation's shares.'
Therefore, it is difficult for shareholders to cash out their
investments.' 8 In addition, the closely held corporation frequently
employs its shareholders, who also play a meaningful role in the
corporation's management.' 9 As a result, shareholders invest
10. See infra Pars III-IV.
11. See infra Parts V-VII.
12. See infra Part VII.
13. 203 N.E.2d 577 (I11. 1965).
14. Id. at 583.
15. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West 1997).
16. See Thomas J. Bamonte, Expanding the Fiduciary Duties of Close Corporation
Shareholders: The Dilemma Facing Illinois Corporate Law, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 257,

258 (1995); see also Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for
Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699, 702 (1993). See generally J.A.C. Hetherington,
Special Characteristics,Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL.

L.F. 1 (analyzing changes in corporation law pertaining to close corporations).
17. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 583-84. The Galler court stated that "[wihile the
shareholder of a public-issue corporation may readily sell his shares on the open market,
...his counterpart of the close corporation often has a large total of his entire capital
invested in the business and has no ready market for his shares should he desire to sell."
Id.; see also Bamonte, supra note 16, at 259 (noting the special characteristics of close
corporations).
18. See Bamonte, supra note 16, at 259.
19. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 584.
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substantial amounts of time and money and expect a return on that
investment in the form of salaries rather than dividends or capital
appreciation. 0
There is a prevailing misconception that the rights of the
shareholders of a closely held corporation are no different than the
rights of shareholders of a public corporation. Majority shareholders
often incorrectly believe that they have the exclusive right to manage
and control the corporation without regard for the interests of the
minority shareholders. Such a misconception can lead to expensive
litigation and result in costly judgments for compensatory and punitive
damages.2z
A. Originsof FiduciaryDuties Among Shareholdersin Closely Held
Corporations
The characteristics unique to closely held corporations give rise to
certain fiduciary duties that do not exist in publicly held corporations.
Because of the separation of ownership and control, a shareholder of2a2
corporation generally owes no fiduciary duties to the corporation.
However, the separation of ownership and control is lacking in a
closely held corporation, where the entity is owned by a small group
of shareholders who also exercise control over its management.
Because of these distinctions, courts have found it necessary to apply
principles concerning fiduciary duties to the officers, directors, and
shareholders of closely held corporations. 23
20. See Bamonte, supra note 16, at 258-59.
21. See Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206 (III. App. Ct. 1994); see also
Zokolych v. Spalding, 344 N.E.2d 805 (I11.App. Ct. 1976) (granting punitive damages
for conspiring to defraud shareholder of his interest in the corporation and to unlawfully
convert corporate assets).
22. See Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 321 (I1l. App. Ct. 1990).
23. See id. at 323; see also Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1218 (7th
Cir. 1995) (maintaining that "[ulnder Illinois law, a shareholder in a close corporation
owes a duty of loyalty to the corporation and to other shareholders"); Illinois Rockford
Corp. v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228, 233 (III. 1968) (explaining that "[tiheir decision to
form and operate as a corporation rather than a partnership does not change the fact that
they were embarking on a joint enterprise, and their mutual obligations were similar to
those of partners" (quoting Tilley v. Shippee, 147 N.E.2d 347, 352 (III. 1958));
Giammanco v. Giammanco, 625 N.E.2d 990, 1002 (III. App. Ct. 1993) (discussing
whether sole and co-equal shareholders owe each other a fiduciary duty similar to that of
partners); Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 556 (II1. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that
those who control the corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders). See generally Bamonte, supra note 16, at 259-261 (discussing the
expansion of fiduciary duty principles intended to protect shareholders against
oppression); Thompson, supra note 16, at 705-06 (finding high vote requirements and
minority-shareholder initiated dissolutions appropriate means to protect minority
investors).
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For example, in Hagshenas v. Gaylord,24 the Illinois Appellate
Court found that a fifty percent shareholder in a closely held
corporation owed a fiduciary duty to the other two shareholders and
the corporation.2 Although the court recognized that a shareholder of
a public corporation, unlike a partner in a partnership, generally owes
no fiduciary duties, 2 it concluded that in "an intimate business venture
such as this, the stockholders of a close corporation occupy a position
similar to joint adventurers and partners. ' ' 2 7 The court reasoned that
unlike shareholders of public corporations, who can readily sell their
stock when disagreements arise, shareholders of closely held
corporations do not have available markets within which to sell their
shares. 2 8 The court explained that engagement in small business
enterprises required the shareholders to place that trust and confidence
in one another, thus establishing a fiduciary duty among the
shareholders.29
Although Hagshenasbecame a subject of widespread criticism and
eii
h decision
did not fundamentally depart from the line of
scrutiny, 30 the
reasoning already adopted by Illinois courts. More than twenty years
prior to Hagshenas,the Illinois Supreme Court found that a fiduciary
relationship could exist among the shareholders of a close
corporation.31 In Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp,32 a fifty percent
shareholder, while negotiating the sale of a business, secretly secured
a better deal for himself than for the company's other fifty percent
shareholder.33 Proclaiming the existence of a fiduciary relationship "in
all cases in which a confidential relationship has been acquired"
regardless of how the confidence originated, the Court held that the
defendant stood in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff and
24. 557 N.E.2d 316.
25. See id. at 323.
26. See id. at 321.
27. Id. at 322 (citing Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
28. See id. at 324.
29. See id. The Hagshenas court referred to Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, in which
the Illinois Supreme Court held that a fiduciary relation exists in all cases where a
confidential relationship has been created. See id. at 324 (citing Illinois Rockford
1968)).
Corp. v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228 (I11.
30. See Bamonte, supra note 16, at 262. The controversy over Hagshenas arose from
its holding that the fifty percent shareholder continued to owe a fiduciary duty despite
his resignation as an officer and director. See Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 323. The court
concluded that the shareholder, by the mere act of maintaining a fifty percent interest,
still exercised considerable control in the corporation. See id.
3 1. See Illinois Rockford Corp., 242 N.E.2d at 233-34.
32. 242 N.E.2d 228 (III. 1968).
33. See id. at 231.
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breached his duty to deal openly and honestly with respect to the sale
of the corporation's stock?'
Hagshenas and Illinois Rockford exemplify the tendency of Illinois
courts to impose fiduciary duties upon the principals of closely held
corporations, both to the corporation and to the other shareholders.35
Courts have held that it is necessary to impose fiduciary duties upon
shareholders of closely held corporations because, although the close
corporation "embodies the corporate form, it in many ways resembles
a partnership. Thus, 'the mere fact that a business is run as a
corporation rather than as a partnership does not shield the business
venturers from a fiduciary duty similar to that of true partners."' 3 6 By
employing this partnership analogy to impose fiduciary duties upon
shareholders of close corporations, Illinois courts are able to protect
minority shareholders from oppressive conduct by the majority.Y
B. Extent of FiduciaryDuties
Fiduciary duties under Illinois law are sweeping, indeed. They do
not cease when the shareholder resigns from his position with the
corporation, is terminated, or is even frozen-out of the business.38
34. Id. at 233.
35. See also Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1995)
(imposing on the shareholder of a closely held corporation a duty of loyalty to the
corporation and other shareholders).
36. Id. at 1219 (quoting Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 322); see also Illinois Rockford,
242 N.E.2d at 233 (quoting Tilley v. Shippee, 147 N.E.2d 347 (I11.1958)).
37. See Rexford Rand, 58 F.3d at 1219; Bamonte, supra note 16, at 259-261;
Thompson, supra note 16, at 705-706; see also Illinois Rockford, 242 N.E.2d at 233
(noting that "[tiheir decision to form and operate as a corporation rather than a
partnership does not change the fact that [the shareholders] were embarking on a joint
enterprise, and their mutual obligations were similar to those of partners"); Doherty v.
Kahn, 682 N.E.2d 163 (I11.App. Ct. 1997) (treating as a partnership a close corporation
in which shareholders acted as directors and officers and participated in the day-to-day
operations); Giammanco v. Giammanco, 625 N.E.2d 990 (II1. App. Ct. 1993) (adopting
the principle that sole and coequal shareholders of the corporation owed each other a
fiduciary duty similar to that of partners); Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549 (III. App.
CL 1982) (determining that a majority shareholder in a close corporation had a fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders because he used his majority status to elect his sister
and brother-in-law to corporate positions, thereby retaining control of the corporation).
But see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 249-252 (1991) (presenting the shortcomings of comparing a closely
held corporation to a partnership).
38. See Rexford Rand, 58 F.3d 1215 (7th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Illinois
substantive law as imposing a duty of loyalty on shareholders to their corporation even
after the shareholders have been frozen out). In Rexford Rand, a company that failed to
file an annual report with the State of Illinois was administratively dissolved, causing it
to lose its rights in the name "Rexford Rand" and another trade name used by the
corporation. See id. at 1217. The defendant, a twenty-five percent shareholder who had
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Moreover, a shareholder can breach his fiduciary duty simply by
placing his own interests above those of the corporation. 9
As fiduciaries, business venturers must "exercise the highest degree
of honesty and good faith in their dealings" with business associates
and the corporation.' ° Thus, shareholders must "deal fairly, honestly
and openly with fellow stockholders and [they must] make disclosure
of all essential information.'"' In such a fiduciary relationship, all
forms of trickery, secret dealings, and preference are prohibited in
matters related to the principal's business. 42 Accordingly, a
shareholder's use of corporate assets to further his own goals is a
violation of his fiduciary duties.'
been terminated from his positions as Vice President and Treasurer prior to the
company's dissolution subsequently reserved these trade names without informing the
other two shareholders. See id. He then secured a new corporate charter in the name of
"Rexford Rand," thereby preventing the original Rexford Rand from re-incorporating
under its original name. See id.
The corporation sued alleging that the defendant had breached his fiduciary duty to the
corporation by depriving the company of the use of its name. See id. In defense, the
defendant maintained that he had been frozen-out of the business, and as such, any
fiduciary duty he owed to the business ended when the other shareholders froze him out.
See id. The court rejected this argument and held that the defendant continued to owe the
corporation a duty of loyalty even while frozen-out of the business. See id. The court
stated that "[m]inority shareholders have an obligation as de facto partners in the joint
venture not to do damage to the corporate interests. If a minority shareholder harms the
corporation through 'unscrupulous and improper "sharp dealings"' with the majority, he
has breached his duty of loyalty." Id. at 1219 (quoting Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 n. 17 (Mass. 1975)).
The court reasoned that by taking the corporate name, defendant unscrupulously
threatened serious damage to the well-being of the company and to the other two
shareholders' investment. See id. at 1220. The court further reasoned that the freeze-out
did not relieve defendant of his duty of loyalty because he was not deprived of his status
as a shareholder. See id. According to the court, even if defendant was frozen-out of the
business, he should not have resorted to self-help measures because Illinois law provides
judicial remedies for disgruntled shareholders. See id. at 1221. The court concluded that
"[ilf shareholders take it upon themselves to retaliate any time they believe they have
been frozen oui, disputes in close corporations will only increase." Id.
39. See id. at 1220 (stating that a shareholder in a close corporation has an
obligation to place "the interests of the corporation above his personal interests").
40. Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp., 407 N.E.2d 821, 831 (Iil. App. Ct. 1980).
41. Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Helms v.
Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957)); see Rexford Rand, 58 F.3d at 1219. In
Rexford Rand, the court stated that shareholders must "deal with the utmost good faith,
fairly, honestly, and openly with their fellow stockholders." Rexford Rand, 58 F.3d at
1219 (quoting In re Dearborn Process Service, Inc., 149 B.R. 872, 880 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993)).
42. See Bakalis v. Bressler, 115 N.E.2d 323, 327 (I1. 1953).
43. See Zokoych v. Spalding, 344 N.E.2d 805, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (finding a
shareholder's fraudulent scheme against another shareholder constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty).
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C. Consequences of Breach of FiduciaryDuty
Aside from compensatory damages, breach of fiduciary duties also
may give rise to punitive damages, particularly when the breach is
intentional.' For instance, in Levy v. Markal Sales Corp.,'5 a forty
percent shareholder of a closely held corporation brought numerous
claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the company's other two
shareholders, alleging that they had conspired against him by secretly
agreeing to terminate plaintiff's employment and by usurping a
valuable business opportunity by establishing their own separate
corporation. 6 After first determining that defendants owed a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and to the plaintiff, the court held that
defendants breached that duty by failing to give the original
corporation the opportunity to represent the large client and by using
the original company's assets to develop and support the new
corporation.47 The court also held that defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by intentionally concealing their agreement from
plaintiff until they fired him. s As a result, the court upheld an award
of punitive damages.49 In reaching its decision, the court stated that
"'[p]unitive damages are appropriate to punish and deter conduct
where the defendant is guilty of. . . an intentional breach of fiduciary
44. See Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206, 1223 (111. App. Ct. 1994); see
also Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schneider, 483 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (II. 1985)
(permitting award of punitive damage where false representations are wantonly made);
Obermaier v. Obermaier, 470 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (III. App. Ct. 1984) (stating that
punitive damages are appropriate to punish and deter intentional breach of fiduciary
duty); Zokoych, 344 N.E.2d at 819 (permitting award of punitive damages where there is
a wanton breach of fiduciary duty).
45. 643 N.E.2d 1206 (111.
App. Ct. 1994).
46. See Levy, 643 N.E.2d at 1210-14. In Levy, 40% of a close corporation's stock
was owned by plaintiff, another 40% was owned by one defendant, and the remaining
20% was owned by another defendant, with all three owners serving in various capacities
as officers, directors, and employees. See id. at 1210. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants secretly entered into an agreement with the corporation providing that the
defendants would remain employed with the company for a five year term and that the
40% shareholder would eventually purchase the interest of the 20% shareholder. See id.
The plaintiff further alleged that, at a directors' meeting after the agreement was signed,
defendants voted to terminate plaintiff's employment. See id. at 1211. Thereafter,
defendants excluded plaintiff from the daily activities of the corporation, only advising
him of their agreement after he had been terminated. See id. Additionally, plaintiff
claimed that defendants rejected an offer to allow the company to represent a large client
and usurped the opportunity by establishing their own separate corporation to represent
the client. Defendants then served as the sole officers, directors, and shareholders of the
new corporation and utilized the original company's assets for the benefit of the new
company. See id.
47. See id. at 1216-17.
48. See id. at 1224.
49. See id.

1998]

Rights and Remedies in a Closely Held Corporation

593

duty.50

III. PROBLEMS ARISING IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
The unique characteristics that differentiate a closely held
corporation from a public one precipitate a multitude of problems
regarding management and control of the close corporation. 5' The
following discussion identifies several of the most common
contentious issues in the operation of a closely held corporation.
A. Oppression of Minority Shareholders

Oppressive conduct by an officer, director, or shareholder of a close
corporation is among the most common problems associated with the
management and control of closely held corporations and often
produces an assortment of dilemmas for the corporation. Because
oppressive behavior among shareholders can come in various forms,
the courts are reluctant to define what constitutes oppressive behavior
too narrowly. Instead, the courts prefer to apply a descriptive
definition characterizing oppression as "arbitrary, overbearing, and
heavy-handed course of conduct. ' '52 Although, under Illinois law, the
mere failure of shareholders to get along does not constitute oppressive53
conduct if the corporation is still performing its corporate functions,
however, a "continuing and escalating deterioration" of the 54business
relationship between shareholders may amount to oppression.
50. Id. at 1223 (quoting Obermaier v. Obermaier, 470 N.E.2d 1047 (III. App. Ct.
1984)). In Obermaier,plaintiff and defendant were brothers that owned equal shares of a
family corporation. See id. at 1050. The brothers decided to sell the corporation and the
defendant dealt with all prospective buyers. See id. Plaintiff's attorney was not
appraised of any developments in the sale of the business. See id. When a sale to a
prospective buyer was canceled, the defendant offered to buy-out the plaintiff. See id.
The defendant told the plaintiff that he would not look for another buyer for at least one
year. See id. However, the day that defendant bought out plaintiff, the defendant
participated in negotiations for the sale of the business at a higher price than originally
contemplated by plaintiff and defendant. See id. at 1050-51. As a result, the defendant
received a great profit. See id. When plaintiff learned of the sale and defendant's profit,
he brought an action against his brother for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties for
failing to disclose all relevant information about the stock sale. See id. at 1051. The
court affirmed the trial's court award of punitive damages because there existed a
"flagrant breach of fiduciary responsibility and clear evidence of fraud." Id. at 1053-54.
5 1. See supra Part II.A.
52. Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (II1. App. Ct.
1972); see infra Part III.A. I. For another discussion of oppressive behavior, see infra
Part VI.
53. See Smith-Shrader Co., Inc. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 291 (II1. App. Ct. 1985);
Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405, 408 (III. App. Ct. 1978).
54. Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (I11.App. Ct. 1980).
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1. Domination of Corporate Affairs by the Majority
Illinois' adoption of a broad definition of "oppressive conduct"
gives courts wide latitude in correcting domineering or abusive
conduct by shareholders. For example, in Compton v. Paul K.
HardingRealty Co., 5 a shareholder brought suit alleging a domination
of corporate affairs by the controlling shareholder.- 6 The plaintiff
alleged that the corporation's operation and management were at the
exclusive direction and control of the defendant and without the
knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs because no notices for
shareholder or director meetings were sent, nor had any such meetings
occurred. 7 The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant earned a salary
greater than what was originally agreed uponi s
The Compton court held that the defendant's failure to call meetings
of the board of directors and failure to consult with plaintiff regarding
the management of corporate affairs, as well as defendant's attitude
and reaction toward plaintiff when questioned about his salary,
constituted "an arbitrary, overbearing, and heavy-handed course of
conduct," and supported a finding of oppression. 9 The court upheld
the trial court's order to dissolve the corporation.'
2. The Freeze Out
Frequently, minority shareholders in closely held corporations
encounter shareholder freeze-out. Illinois courts have used the term
"freeze-out" to refer to:
the use of corporate control vested in the statutory majority of
shareholders or the board of directors to eliminate minority
shareholders from the enterprise or reduce their voting power or
claims on corporate assets to relative insignificance. A freezeout implies a purpose to force upon the minority shareholder a
change which is not incident to any other corporate business
goal. 1
55. 285 N.E.2d 574 (II1. App. Ct. 1972).
56. See id. at 577.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 581.
60. See id.
61. Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1227 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Fleming v. International Pizza Supply Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (citation omitted), vacated, 676 N.E.2d 1051 (Ind. 1997)); see also Bamonte,
supra note 16, at 257-60. In the prototypical situation, a controlling shareholder
unilaterally: terminates a minority shareholder-employee; removes the minority
shareholder from the board of directors; and then pays no dividends, causing the
minority shareholder to receive no return on his or her investment. See Bamonte, supra

19981

Rights and Remedies in a Closely Held Corporation

595

The following example illustrates the dynamics of a freeze-out in a
close corporation. Two equal shareholders are sole directors of a
family business. The corporate bylaws provide that the directors can
only take corporate action by a majority vote. One shareholder denies
the other access to the corporate books and records. Without a
majority vote, the shareholder also amends the bylaws to add a third
director position and appoints a long-time business associate to that
position. Such action eliminates the need for the other shareholder's
approval to take future corporate action.
Another typical freeze-out technique is used when a minority
shareholder is threatened with termination from his employment within
the corporation in order to force a sale of his shares of stock at a
deflated price.61 Terminating a minority shareholder's employment is
particularly devastating because it leaves the shareholder "'frozen-out'
yet 'locked in."' When a shareholder is "frozen-out, yet locked in,"
he still holds his stock, but he has no ability to participate in corporate
governance or to protect his investment, and he receives no financial
return on his investment. With depleted funds and no available market
for corporate shares, the majority often pressures the minority
shareholder into selling his shares for far less than their worth. 6'
The Hagshenas and Rexford Rand holdings further amplify the
difficulties created when a shareholder is terminated from his
employment with the close corporation.65 Both Hagshenas and
Rexford Rand hold that a shareholder maintains his fiduciary duty to
the corporation even after the shareholder's employment with the
corporation is terminated. 66 Thus, under Hagshenas and Rexford
Rand, a majority shareholder might rely on the minority shareholder's
fiduciary duty to create what is in essence a common law covenant not
to compete against the majority shareholder. 67 The minority
note 16, at 257-60.
62. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); see
also F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY

§ 3.06 (2d ed. 1985) (describing a minority shareholder's removal from a
management or employment position as "a devastatingly effective squeeze-out
technique").
63. Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
425, 431 (1990).
64. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 62, at § 3.06.
65. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text (discussing both cases).
66. See supra notes 30 and 38.
67. See William Lynch Schaller, Competing After Leaving: Fiduciary Duties of
Closely Held Corporation Shareholders After Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 84 ILL. B.J. 354,
357 (1996).
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shareholder is then both frozen-out of the corporation and barred from
seeking employment with a business in competition with or even in the
same industry as the corporation from which he was ousted. In such a
situation, the minority shareholder might be prevented from exercising
the very skills that he relies on to earn a living. The minority
shareholder would be frozen-out of both the business he owns and his
chosen profession. Courts should freely exercise the powers granted
to them under section 12.56 of the Business Corporation Act and the
common law to fashion an appropriate remedy under these
circumstances.
Additional methods that freeze shareholders out of the corporation
include: controlling signatory rights on corporate accounts; hiding
checkbooks; changing locks; withholding financial information; or
making a resolution to relieve minority shareholders of their positions
as director, officer, or employee of the corporation. 68 Regardless of
the method of freeze-out, when a shareholder is frozen-out, he is
deprived of any opportunity to participate meaningfully in the
management of the corporation.
3. The Conspiratorial Ploy
Minority shareholders of close corporations also may face another
'
form of corporate oppression, the "conspiratorial ploy."69
When
shareholders conspire against minority shareholders, such action can
affect an individual shareholder's right to participate in the
management and control of the corporation, as well as any right to
benefit from its effective operation or profitability. For example, in
Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc.,70 among the three individuals who owned
equal shares of a close corporation, two shareholders conspired to
deprive the plaintiff of control of the corporation. 7 ' The two
shareholders expressed an apparent interest in selling their shares and
indicated that they found potential buyers, allowing them to determine

68. See Hager-Freeman v. Spircoff, 593 N.E.2d 821, 829-31 (11. App. Ct. 1992)
(holding that the trial court erred in dismissing, for failure to state a cause of action, one
count of a shareholder's complaint which alleged that another shareholder controlled
signatory rights on corporate accounts, hid checkbooks, changed the locks on the
business, and withheld financial information).
69. See Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (I11.
App. Ct. 1980)
(holding a conspiratorial ploy is oppressive when conspiratorial action that affects a
shareholder's control over corporate matters is paired with irregularity in equity
transfers).
70. 405 N.E.2d 839 (11. App. Ct. 1980).
71. See id. at 842.
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the market value of their shares. 72 Despite the plaintiff's desire to buyout one of the other two shareholders, the other two shareholders
rejected his offer, even though he had funds to almost pay the quoted
price. 73 Rather than selling to an outside party, one shareholder sold
to the other on an installment plan with preferential terms; this deal was
not offered to the plaintiff, leaving the plaintiff with a minority
interest.74 Once in control, the majority shareholder fired the plaintiff,
depriving the plaintiff of his position in the corporation, his share of
corporate control, and his managerial employment.75
Because of a "continuing and escalating deterioration" of the
business relationship between the plaintiff and the majority
shareholder, the court in Notzke ultimately dissolved the corporation. 76
The court held that "[c]onspiratorial action allegedly affecting [the
plaintiff's] control over corporate matters and the effective operation
and profitability of the venture coupled with alleged
7 irregularity in the
equity transfer" amounted to oppressive conduct.7
B. Corporate Deadlock
Corporate deadlock occurs when "because of decision or indecision
of stockholders, [the corporation] cannot perform its corporate
powers." 78 Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co.79 provides a typical
example of corporate deadlock. In Gidwitz, two factions of one
family equally divided the stock of a corporation.' An equal number
of family members representing each faction comprised the
corporation's board of directors.8 ' With the corporation's president
being head of one of the two factions, its shareholders and directors
72. See id. at 841; see also infra Part III.F (discussing the problem of share valuation
in close corporations).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 841-42.
76. Id. at 844.
77. Id. at 843.
78. Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405, 408 (II1. App. Ct. 1978) (quoting RKO
Theaters, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theaters Co., 74 A.2d 914, 918 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1950)). In Callier, the Fifth District also relied upon the dictionary
definition of deadlock which described it as a "counteraction of things producing entire
stoppage; hence, a state of inaction or of neutralization caused by the opposition of
persons or of factions, as in a government or in a voting body." Id. at 408 (quoting
WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 674 (2d ed. 1956) (emphasis
added by court)).
79. 170 N.E.2d 131 (Ii. 1960).
80. See id. at 135.
81. See id. at 133-34.
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became hopelessly deadlocked because those from one faction voted in
one manner,
while those from the other faction voted in another
s2
manner.
For ten years, the president refused to consult with the directors of
the opposite faction regarding corporate policy decisions.' Although
the opposing faction continuously requested that the number of
shareholders and directors be increased in order to break the deadlock,
the president refused to call any meetings to effectuate such change.'
Thus, the president utilized his position in the corporation to deprive
the opposing faction of participating and managing the corporation.8
This ten-year deadlock among shareholders
prompted the Gidwitz
6
court to ultimately dissolve the corporation."
C. Fraudulentand Illegal Acts
Many individuals who invest in a close corporation assume that their
business partners will not act fraudulently or illegally. Unfortunately,
this assumption is not always correct. Indeed, disputes and problems
that arise among shareholders in closely held corporations are often the
result of illegal conduct or fraud.8' For example, in Kalabogias v.
Georgou,' two brothers who owned a forty-nine percent stake in a
restaurant brought suit for dissolution of the corporation based on the
illegal activities of the majority shareholders. 89 Although the
82. See id. at 136.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 135.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 138. Because the corporation's directors and shareholders were
hopelessly deadlocked and unable to manage corporate affairs, the court decided to
dissolve the corporation based on: (1) the failure to call annual meetings of the
shareholders for ten consecutive years, (2) the failure to end deadlock by enacting
amendments proposed at director and shareholder meetings, and (3) numerous instances
of improper conduct by the defendant including: (a) his unilateral decision to hire
someone as a corporate "employee" at a salary comparable to that of other board
members and to allow that employee to use the company car; (b) his decision to give
gave salary increases to two assistant secretaries without approval of the board of
directors; (c) his use of corporate funds to organize another corporation without board
approval; (d) his decision to borrow over $500,000 for the corporation from banks and
partnerships in which he was part owner without approval of the board of directors; (e)
his execution of a proxy to himself voting the stock of one of the corporation's
subsidiaries; and (f) his deductions from plaintiff's salary also without board approval.
See id. at 135-38.
87. See, e.g., Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. 1996); Gidwitz v. Lanzit
Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (11. 1960)
88. 627 N.E.2d 51 (I1l. App. Ct. 1993).
89. See id. at 53-54. In Kalabogias, one of the majority shareholders had maintained
false and fraudulent accounts and failed to report the corporation's actual income and

1998]

Rights and Remedies in a Closely Held Corporation

599

defendants claimed that the plaintiffs could notproceed individually
with a suit seeking the corporation's dissolution,w the court held that it
"is the rule that a minority shareholder may sue the corporation directly
for its dissolution if he can establish that 'those in control of the
corporation have acted ... in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent."' 9 Additionally, the court held that "[tihe rationale
underlying this remedy is to protect the interests of minority
shareholders against majority shareholders who 'reap the benefits of
ownership through compensation and other withdrawals not available
to the minority. ' 92
D. CorporateWaste and Mismanagement
Another problem commonly found in closely held corporations is
corporate waste and mismanagement. Corporate assets are wasted or
mismanaged when they are expended and "no consideration is received
in exchange" and "there is no rational business purpose, or, if
consideration is received in exchange, the consideration the
corporation receives is so inadequate in value that no person of
ordinary sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the
corporation has paid."93 Generally, courts in Illinois strictly adhere to
the policy prohibiting a shareholder from using corporate assets to
further the shareholder's own interests.94 The classic example of
corporate waste and mismanagement occurs when the president or
majority shareholder of a corporation unilaterally takes out loans on
behalf of the corporation and uses the loan funds to start a new
expenses. See id. at 55-56. This shareholder had also destroyed the corporation's
business records reflecting actual gross receipts and its diaries of daily cash
expenditures. See id. at 56. Additionally, minutes of shareholder meetings were
inaccurately kept and copies of waiver of notice of shareholders and directors meetings
were altered and inaccurately circulated. See id. Furthermore, records were illegally
altered to reflect the election of the majority shareholder's wife as a director when, in
fact, she had not ever been properly or legally elected. See id.
90. See id. at 56.
91. Id. at 57 (quoting 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-50(b)(2) (West 1992)).
92. Kalabogias, 627 N.E.2d at 57 (quoting Murdock, supra note 63, at 425).
93. Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors'
Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALl's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 957 n.11 (1993) (citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.42 (proposed final draft 1992)); see
also Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979) (commenting that "[tihe
essence of a claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion of corporate assets for
improper or unnecessary purposes").
App. Ct. 1994);
94. See Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206, 1217 (I11.
Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 556 (III. App. Ct. 1982); Zokoych v. Spalding,
App. Ct. 1976).
344 N.E.2d 805, 814 (111.
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corporation of his own. 95
E. Succession Planning: Problems Associated with the Transfer of
Ownership and Control of the Closely Held Corporation
Within the closely held corporation, the death or departure of a
shareholder can lead to various problems of ownership and control.
Upon their death, shareholders of closely held corporations often leave
their shares to family members or parties outside the corporation. For
the remaining shareholders, this new ownership will threaten or
change the established control and management of the corporation.
To illustrate, suppose two shareholders own a close corporation,
each owning equal portions of the business and each serving as its
only officers and directors. Suppose further that one shareholder dies,
leaving his shares to his spouse. The remaining shareholder,
however, refuses to recognize the widow's right to participate in the
management and control of the corporation. The surviving
shareholder unilaterally issues a resolution amending the corporation's
bylaws, reducing the number of directors from two to one director.
The surviving shareholder also elects himself and his spouse as the
corporation's officers. With the newly acquired control, the remaining
shareholder executes a corporate resolution that limits corporate
business and decision-making, including all aspects of the
corporation's finances, to only himself and his wife.
In such a situation, the widow becomes powerless to participate in
any corporate activity despite new fifty percent ownership interest.
The deceased shareholder could not have envisioned that his family
would be effectively shut-out of the business he founded. This
example illustrates the need for shareholders to enter into shareholder
agreements to anticipate problems that can occur with the transfer of
ownership. Without such an agreement, the widow will be left to seek
relief in the courts.
F. "Cashing Out" Shares: Problems Associated with Exiting the
Corporation
Many problems arise in the closely held or family corporation when
a shareholder desires to relinquish his ownership in the company and
attempts to sell his shares to an outside party. Generally, there is no
95. See Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793 (II. 1960).
Because an executive's time is also a corporate asset, an executive may not use his time
at work to advance his own interest contrary to that of the corporation. See, e.g.,
Graham, 444 N.E.2d at 558.
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market for selling such an interest, particularly a minority interest. 96
Therefore, the party seeking to "cash out" has few, if any, options for
exiting a close corporation without losing his investment.
For example, assume a close corporation has two shareholders, one
holding a majority interest and the other holding a minority interest.
Both shareholders are the sole officers and directors of the business.
Further assume that the business is very successful and operates
without any internal problems among shareholders or between a
shareholder and the corporation. Next assume that the minority
shareholder wants to sell her shares, which could occur for any
number of reasons, including the immediate need for money or the
simple desire to leave the business.
The minority shareholder is faced with a dilemma because section
12.56 does not explicitly authorize the courts to compel the majority
shareholder or the corporation to buy-out her shares, in such a
situation. Additionally, outside parties generally will have little interest
in buying into a minority position in a close corporate setting. 97 In this
situation, the minority shareholder has few, if any, options and
remains effectively trapped in the close corporation. Like the example
above, this situation illustrates the need for shareholders to enter into
shareholder agreements to anticipate the many problems that can occur
in a close corporation.
IV.

METHODS OF AVOIDING PROBLEMS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS

A. ShareholderAgreements
One method of avoiding the problems encountered in close
corporations and the costly litigation that results is the use of carefully
drafted shareholder agreements. Shareholder agreements are contracts
among shareholders that define arrangements among shareholders that
98
are not covered by the corporation's governing documents.
Shareholder agreements can be used to protect minority shareholders,
avoid deadlock, protect ownership interests, create a valuation formula
96. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
98. See Kerry M. Lavelle, Drafting Shareholder Agreements for the Closely-Held
Business, 4 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 109, 110 (1991). For shareholder agreement forms, see
Stanley Keller, An Overview of Stockholder Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE
AGREEMENTS, at 245, 247-52 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-1025, 1997-98). See also Lawrence D. Levin., Checklist for Shareholders'
Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 1996, at 147, 149-54 (PLI Corp. Law

and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-957, 1996).
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for shares, and provide an exit strategy for shareholders. 99
Effective shareholder agreements should include a right of first
refusal."' 0 A right of first refusal requires that a shareholder who
wishes to sell his shares must first offer the shares to the corporation
and its other shareholders before offering them to outside parties. 1 '
Giving the corporation a right of first refusal enables its remaining
shareholders to veto the addition of new shareholders.1 2 An effective
shareholder agreement also should provide for the involuntary transfer
of shares and should include an option to sell. 10 3 An option to sell
clause requires that a corporation or its shareholders purchase all
shares that an exiting shareholder seeks to sell. 0 4 An involuntary
transfer clause requires that a shareholder allow the corporation or its
shareholders to purchase shares if his shares become subject to any
encumbrances or liens.0 5 Such agreements effectively enable existing
shareholders to maintain control and prevent unwanted outside parties
from obtaining an interest in their corporation. 0 6
Shareholder agreements also can be an effective method of resolving
deadlock among shareholders.
Through such agreements,
shareholders may agree to appoint an arbitrator to resolve any deadlock
issues. Moreover, shareholder agreements may specify that a
particular arbitrator, president, director, or corporate counsel cast the
deciding vote whenever deadlock occurs.'°7

99. See Lavelle, supra note 98, at 112-129 (discussing in detail the contents of
shareholders agreements). One example of a shareholder agreement is found in Butler v.
Kent, 655 N.E.2d 1120 (II1.App. Ct. 1995). In Butler, the court found that the plaintiff
shareholder failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the proper amount due
him pursuant to a buy-out provision of a shareholder agreement. See id. at 1127. The
shareholder agreement provided that, at the election of any one shareholder, the two
remaining shareholders would be required to either buy the electing shareholder's entire
interest or sell the corporation with one-third of the proceeds going to the electing
shareholder. See id. at 1122. The shareholder agreement also included a formula for
determining the fair market value of the corporation to be sold, allowing for attorneys
fees and expenses, for the prevailing party in an action to "enforce" the agreement. See
id. at 1123.
100. See Lavelle, supra note 98, at 112.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 113-15. An option to sell is also known as a "put" option. See id. at
113.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 114-115.
106. See id. at 110.
107. See Lavelle, supra note 98, at 127.
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Finally, shareholder agreements may set forth one of many available
methods for valuating shares."08 There are several different methods
of valuation that can be used to establish a purchase price for shares,
depending on the characteristics of a particular close corporation. The
simplest, but the least accurate method, is the fixed price method that
allows shareholders to preset the price in the agreement.' 0 9 The
obvious shortcoming of the fixed price method lies in the fluctuation of
the value of the shares over time." 0 Another method used to value
corporate shares is the book value method that determines the book
value of the corporation's assets by dividing the corporation's net
worth (assets minus liabilities) by the amount of outstanding shares."'
Further, the capitalization of earnings method also can be utilized for
share valuation. Under the capitalization of earnings method, the value
of a shareholder's shares is determined by studying the historical
income information of the corporation and projecting earnings into the
future for a set number of years."12 Finally, another method of share
valuation involves allowing share values to be set by professional
appraisers. 113
Despite the substantial protections shareholder agreements afford,
there are limits to the use of shareholder agreements because
shareholders cannot use such agreements to permit certain acts of
wrongful or oppressive conduct or corporate waste." 4 Recently, the
Illinois Appellate Court examined this issue in Winston & Strawn v.
Nosal." 5 Although the Nosal decision involves a partnership
agreement, it nevertheless is instructive for shareholders of close
corporations. Specifically, the court applied a general rule that
prohibits the use of such agreements to act in an illegal or oppressive
manner."' In Nosal, the plaintiff was expelled from the partnership
108. For a more detailed discussion of the methods used in valuating shares, see
Lavelle, supra note 98, at 120-124. See also Murdock, supra note 63, at 471-488
(analyzing the effectiveness of various valuation methods in judicially ordered buyouts).
109. See Lavelle, supra note 98, at 121.
110. See id.
111. See id. This method, however, rarely reflects the true value of the business. See
id.
112. See id. at 122.
113. See id. at 123-24.
114. See supra notes 94-95.
115. 664 N.E.2d 239 (I11.App. Ct.), appeal denied, 671 N.E.2d 745 (III. 1996).
116. See id. at 245-46. Due to the tendency of Illinois courts to employ the
partnership analogy in cases involving close corporations, it is likely that this case
would have had a similar outcome had it involved a closely held corporation. See supra
Part II.A.
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after a majority vote pursuant to the terms of their partnership
agreement." 7 The court held that "[riegardless of the discretion
conferred upon partners under a partnership agreement, [contractual
freedom] does not abrogate [the partners'] high duty to exercise
good
' 18
faith and fair dealing in the execution of such. discretion."
B. Voting Agreements
Voting agreements serve as another method that allows shareholders
of close corporations to avoid internal problems." 9 Voting agreements
bind shareholders in how they may vote their stock on corporate
issues. 20 Such agreements prevent minority shareholders from being
at "the mercy of an oppressive or unknowledgeable majority."''
Unlike in public corporations, the shares of close corporations are
usually held by members of the board of directors. As a result, a
board's decisions are rarely made free of the influence or personal
motivations of its members as shareholders. Through effective voting
agreements, shareholders can reduce the risk of such influences and
secure "the rights and obligations of all concerned."'2
In Illinois, voting agreements are enforced in accordance with the
principles of equity."2 Provided that no fraud is committed on the
corporation or its minority stockholders and that public policy is not
subverted, such agreements can provide that the majority stockholders
will vote together and thus control the corporation. 2 4 Moreover, a
court may not inquire as to the shareholder's motive that actuates the
distribution of his votes under voting agreements. 25 Voting
agreements can continue in effect for the lifetime of the particular
stockholders and, in addition, can provide for the election of certain

117. See Nosal, 664 N.E.2d at 243.
118. Id. at 246 (citing Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 313 (I11.
App. Ct.
1989)).
119. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7.70 (West 1993). The statute provides:
"Shareholders may provide for the voting of their shares by signing an agreement for
that purpose . . . . A voting agreement created under this Section is specifically
enforceable in accordance with the principles of equity." Id.
120. See id. See generally George S. Hoban, Voting Control Methods, 1958 U. ILL.
L.F. 110, 114 (1958) (outlining various methods of allocating shareholder voting
control).
121. Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (I11.
1964).
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Luthy v. Ream, 110 N.E. 373 (11. 1915); Venner v. Chicago City Ry.
Co., 101 N.E. 949, 953 (Ill.
1913).
125. See Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 67 N.E. 17, 18 (II1. 1903).
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persons to specified offices for a fixed period of years."'
C. Voting Trusts
Another method of avoiding problems among shareholders within
the closely held corporation is the use of voting trusts. Through a
voting trust, shareholders transfer legal title and voting rights to a
trustee or trustees for a period not to exceed ten years, while
personally retaining the other incidents of share ownership.' 2 7
Because voting trusts generally grant full voting rights to the trustee,
they effectively protect minority interests by allowing for the impartial
selection of corporate directors.' 28 The principal purpose of a voting
trust is to acquire voting control of the corporation. 129 Therefore, a
voting trust can act as an useful instrument to prevent competing
shareholders from attempting to gain control of the corporation. 30
The creation of a voting trust limits the powers of shareholders
because shareholders are left with only equitable ownership of stock,
while the trustee becomes legal titleholder or owner of the stock.'
Full voting power passes from the shareholder to the trustee, and as
such, the trustee possesses control over significant corporate
decisions. 132
In order for a voting trust to be valid, Illinois courts have
established the following requirements: the stock voting rights must be
separate and distinct from other attributes of ownership; the transfer of
these voting rights must be intended as irrevocable and for a definite
period of time; and the principal purpose must be to acquire voting
control of the corporation.133 A voting trust, however, may be
established for any additional purpose as long as that purpose is not
126. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 586.
127. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.65 (1996); see also Timothy W. Swain, What
Every Lawyer Should Know About Voting Trusts in Illinois, 42 ILL. B. J. 878 (1954)
(discussing the voting trust in Illinois and its purpose, validity, form, and obligations).
128. See Swain, supra note 127, at 878-79 (discussing the purpose of voting trusts
and their ability to protect minority interests and insure stability of management).
129. See Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 805 (Del. 1966) ("[tlhe principal
purpose of [creating a voting trust] is to acquire voting control of the corporation").
130. See Swain, supra note 127, at 879; see also 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER Er AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, §

2092

(perm. ed. rev.

vol.

1996) (discussing the legal "[rights and status of shareholders voting trust certificate
holder[s]").
131. See Swain, supra note 127, at 878; see also FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 130, §
2092, at 442-44.
132. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 130, §§ 2075, 2092, at 382-84, 442-4.
133. See Tankersley v. Albright, 374 F.2d 538, 547 (N.D. II1. 1974), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 514 F. Supp. 956 (7th Cir. 1975).
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prohibited by any statute or rule of public policy."3
Furthermore, although the statute defining voting trusts states that
35
they are to remain effective for a period not to exceed ten years,
shareholders may agree to extend a voting trust or make a new voting
trust for an additional ten-year period. 36 Although no particular form
for a voting trust exists, typical components
37 include the trust purpose
and a recitation of the duties of the trustee.
V.

JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF SHAREHOLDERS

Judicial relief is often the only remedy available to shareholders who
do not anticipate the inherent problems in closely held corporations by
entering into shareholder agreements, voting agreements, or voting
trusts. Prior to the enactment of section 12.56 of the Business
Corporation Act, however, disgruntled shareholders would only
encounter courts reluctant to provide relief for close corporations when
shareholder relationships broke down. 38 The judiciary's aversion
toward remedies for close corporations led shareholders to resort to
self-help measures
that were injurious both to themselves and the
39
corporation. 1
The use of such self-help measures eventually prompted the Illinois
General Assembly and the Illinois courts to adopt a solution to
corporate oppression that is both effective yet also extremely
flexible. 40 Today, Illinois courts are sympathetic to the plight of
134. See Gumbiner v. Alden Inn, Inc., 59 N.E.2d 648, 651 (III. 1945) (holding that
"the purpose for which a voting trust is created determines its legality"); see also
FLETCHER Er AL., supra note 130, § 2080, at 399-400 ("[Tlherefore, for a voting trust to
be against public policy today, some statute must forbid what in some material part it
tends to do, differentiating it from other personal property trusts, or else it must be
obnoxious to some settled common-law principle, including in the latter such as are
settled by judicial decisions.").
135. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.65 (1996).

136. See Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 102 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Il. App. Ct. 1951)
(providing that it is "immaterial whether the agreement be called an extension of the
voting trust or a new voting trust").
137. For a more detailed discussion and suggested elements of voting trusts, see
Swain, supra note 127, at 882-83.
138. See Thomas J. Bamonte, Amendments to the Shareholder Remedies Section of

the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 84 ILL. B. J. 256, 256 (1996).
139. See id. at 256-57 (citing Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (111.App. Ct.
1990)). In Hagshenas, the owner of fifty percent of the shares of a close corporation
sought dissolution of the business based on the dissension and deadlock between
himself and the other fifty percent shareholders. See Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 317-18.
When the court rejected plaintiff's petition and refused to intervene, plaintiff resorted to
self-help measures which included establishing a competing business and hiring former
employees of the close corporation. See id. at 318-320.
140. See Bamonte, supra note 138, at 256-57; see also Debate on S. 433 Before the
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oppressed shareholders and have broad powers to redress shareholder
grievances.' 4 ' The following comparison of the status quo ante with
the current courts' attitude toward troubled close corporations will
illustrate the significance of recent changes.
A. Illinois Law Priorto the Enactment of Section 12.56
The enactment of section 12.56 provides shareholders with broad
equitable solutions for disputes arising within the closely held
corporation. However, prior to the enactment of section 12.56,
Illinois courts opted to abstain from intervening to resolve conflicts in
close corporations. Specifically, two court decisions, followed by a
statutory amendment, significantly affected the judiciary's refusal to
resolve conflicts in close corporations.
1. Coduti v. Hellwig
The decision in Coduti v. Hellwig 42 exemplified the earlier attitude
of Illinois courts toward judicial intervention in closely held
corporations. In Coduti, the First District of the Illinois Appellate
Court concluded that, before a court should order a remedy other than
dissolution, the defendant's conduct must be so egregious that it
warranted dissolution. 43 In Coduti, the plaintiff and defendant
formed a corporation, in which plaintiff owned forty percent of the
stock and defendant owned the remaining sixty percent.'" The board
of directors of the corporation consisted of the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the defendant's son. 45
A series of disputes led the plaintiff to file an action for dissolution
of the corporation, alleging oppressive conduct."46 The plaintiff's
oppression allegations against the defendant included: refusing to
authorize dividends or bonuses despite large cash reserves of the
Gen. Assembly, 89th Legis., 2d Sess. 171-74 (Ill. May 20, 1995) (amending the
Illinois Business Corporation Act and specifying how a disgruntled shareholder of a
close corporation can solve problems without resorting to dissolution).
141. See infra Part V.B; see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West Supp.
1997) (granting Illinois courts broad powers to intervene not only in situations where
oppressive behavior exists, but also where shareholders are deadlocked in voting power,
the directors are deadlocked, the directors act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent, or
in situations where corporate waste or mismanagement has occurred).
142. 469 N.E.2d 220 (III. App. Ct. 1984), overruled by Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d
1171 (Ill. 1996).
143. See id. at 224 (providing that the Illinois Supreme Court regards dissolution as a
"drastic remedy that must not be lightly invoked").
144. See id. at 223.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 224.
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corporation; refusing to allow the participation of the plaintiff's
attorney at directors' meetings; holding directors' meetings without
notice to the plaintiff; opening the plaintiff's mail without his
authorization; and finally, belittling plaintiff in public and causing his
arrest.147
Despite the severity of the allegations, conflicting testimony
prevented the court in Coduti from finding sufficient oppression to
warrant dissolution of the corporation.". Explaining its reasoning, the
Coduti court noted that the alleged oppressive behavior must be
analyzed in the context of a corporate organization, stating that it is:
fundamental in the law of corporations that the majority of its
stockholders shall control the policy of the corporation, and
regulate and govern the lawful exercise of its franchise and
business. Every one purchasing or subscribing for stock in a
corporation impliedly agrees that he will be bound b' the acts
and proceedings done or sanctioned by the majority.
Accordingly, the Coduti court adhered to the line of decisions of
Illinois courts that abstained from intervention in closely held
corporations. ' 5° Its ruling indicated a reluctance by courts to involve
themselves in the regulation of a corporation's internal affairs.
2. Section 12.55 and Its Judicial Interpretation
Following the Coduti decision, section 12.55 of the Illinois
Business Corporation Act became effective. s' The new section
purported to help resolve shareholder conflicts similar to the one in
Coduti. In lieu of ordering dissolution of the corporation, section
12.55 provided the court with the option of alternative remedies to
dissolution, such as appointment of a provisional director or a
custodian, or a direction to purchase the complaining shareholder's
shares.' 2
147. See id. at 225.
148. See id. at 227 (providing that determinations of fraud and oppression depend on
the facts of each case).
149. Id. at 229 (quoting Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 184 N.E.2d 792 (I11.
App. Ct. 1962)). The Polikoff court further noted that even though there might be a
"wiser policy" for a business it is not the role of a court of equity to oversee the
operation of a corporation. Polikoff, supra, at 795.
150. See Bamonte, supra note 138, at 258.
151. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.55 (West 1993), amended by Act of Aug. 9,
1996, Pub. Act No. 89-626, Art. 2, § 2-83, and Act of Aug. 18, 1995, Pub. Act No. 89364, § 52, and Act of Jul. 19, 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-169, § 5.
152. See id. Section 12.55 provided in part:
In either an action for dissolution pursuant to Section 12.50 or an action
which alleges the grounds for dissolution set forth in Section 12.50 but which
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In light of the legislature's enactment of section 12.55, the plaintiff
in Coduti petitioned the court for rehearing, requesting the alternative
remedy of a forced purchase of his shares.' 53 However, the appellate
court denied the plaintiff's request, holding that in order to obtain any
remedy for alleged shareholder wrongdoing, including "alternative
remedies" such as buy-out, a plaintiff must show enough evidence of
wrongdoing that would be sufficient to allow the court to order
dissolution of the corporation.'-" Thus, because the plaintiff failed to
allege acts sufficient to order dissolution, the Coduti court held that he
was not entitled to any remedy. 55 Consequently, the Coduti decision
established a very high threshold for the availability of alternative
remedies, rendering section 12.55 unattainable for disgruntled
shareholders in most circumstances.
3. Schirmer v. Bear
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court revisited the issue of
alternative remedies and rejected the idea that a disgruntled shareholder
must establish that the defendant's conduct warrants judicial
dissolution before obtaining an alternative remedy." 5 Rejecting the
Coduti holding, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a disgruntled
shareholder need not prove that the defendant's wrongdoing was so
severe that it would justify dissolving the corporation in order to obtain
alternative relief.157
In Schirmer, a corporation's shares were divided approximately
39% to 61% between the plaintiff and defendant respectively.' 58 The
company's board of directors initially consisted of plaintiff, defendant,
does not seek dissolution, the circuit court, in lieu of dismissing the action or
ordering dissolution, may retain jurisdiction and:
(1) Appoint a provisional director;
(2) Appoint a custodian; or
(3) In an action by a shareholder, order a purchase of the complaining
shareholder's shares lat a fair price determined by the court].
Id. at 12.55(a).
153. See Coduti, 469 N.E.2d at 231.
154. See id. (explaining that the trial court previously determined that the defendants
did not act with oppression, fraud, or illegality).
155. See id.
156. See Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171 (Il. 1996).
157. See id. at 1176. Because the plaintiff filed his action prior to the enactment of
section 12.56, the court reached its decision by analyzing section 12.55, which
provided alternative remedies for both close and public corporations. However, the
court specifically noted that its holding "comports with the current statutory scheme
regulating shareholder remedies for non-public corporations" under section 12.56. See
id.
158. See id. at 1172.
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and defendant's friend.'5 9 At a meeting of the board of directors,
defendant moved to amend the bylaws of the corporation to reduce the
number of directors from three to one." 6 The motion passed after
defendant voted his 61.1% of his shares in support of the motion and
plaintiff voted his 38.9% interest against the motion.6 Defendant
proceeded to nominate himself as sole director and was elected on the
strength of his 61.1% ownership interest. 62
As sole director, defendant appointed himself president and
63
treasurer of the corporation and appointed his wife secretary.1
Defendant extracted plaintiff's name from the corporation's accounts
and set a date for plaintiff's termination from employment with the
business."6 As a result, plaintiff filed an action alleging that defendant
wasted corporate assets and acted in an illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent manner.1 65 Plaintiff requested that the court dissolve the
corporation or, in the alternative, order the corporation to buy his
shares from him. 166 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
disgruntled shareholder was in fact entitled to an alternative remedy
without establishing that the defendant's conduct was so severe that it
justified dissolution of the corporation. 67
B. Section 12.56 of the Illinois Business CorporationAct
As the Schirmer appeal was pending, the Illinois legislature revised
old section 12.55'68 and enacted an entirely new section, 12.56, to
specifically address remedies in closely held corporations.169 Section
12.56 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, which became
effective in July 1995, contains a nonexclusive list of remedies
intended to address the unique problems arising in the close, nonpublic corporation.' 70 Although the remedies available for public
corporations are codified under section 12.55,'~' section 12.56
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
section
169.
170.
171.

See id.
See id. at 1173.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1176.
See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.55 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997). This
provides now for alternative remedies in public corporations.
See id. at 5/12.56.
See id.
See id. at 5/12.55. The statute applies to a corporation that "has shares listed
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provides for alternative remedies for close corporations.' 72 Section
12.56 defines a non-public corporation as "a corporation that has no
shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a
market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated
securities association.' 73 To be eligible for a remedy under the
statute, the shareholder must establish at least one of the following: (1)
the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power; (2) the directors have
acted in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; or (3)
corporate waste or mismanagement has occurred.' 74
As indicated previously, one method of invoking the statutory
remedies from the court is to establish that shareholders have acted in
an oppressive manner. 75 To establish oppressive conduct, it is not
necessary to prove fraud, illegality, or loss as long as "the record
exhibits a continuing course of oppressive conduct for which the
future holds little or no hope of abatement."'' 76 A "continuing and
escalating deterioration" of the business relationship between
shareholders177exhibits oppressive conduct and may warrant an order of
dissolution.
An examination of case law discloses that no single, particular
action by itself can be deemed "oppressive" without also examining the
surrounding circumstances. 78 Under Illinois law, the mere failure of
shareholders to get along does not constitute oppressive conduct if the
corporation is still performing its corporate functions.' 79 However,
oppressive conduct is liberally construed and includes any "arbitrary,

on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or
more members of a national or affiliated securities association." Id. The remedies
available to shareholders of public corporations include:
(1) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation to serve for the term and under the conditions prescribed by the
court;
(2) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for the term and under
the conditions prescribed by the court;
(3) The dissolution of the corporation.
Id. at 5/12.55(b).
172. See id. at 5/12.56.
173. Id. at 5/12.56(a).
174. See id.
175. For examples of oppressive behavior, see supra Part III.A.
176. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (II1. 1960).
177. Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839, 843 (111.App. Ct. 1980).
178. See Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220, 225 (III. App. Ct. 1984), overruled by
Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171 (111. 1996).
179. See Smith-Shrader Co., Inc. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 291 (I11. App. Ct.
1985).
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overbearing and heavy-handed course of conduct." 8 ' Moreover,
courts will make a determination as to whether conduct is oppressive
on a case-by-case basis.' 8 '
Once a shareholder establishes the threshold requirement, the court
may order any one of twelve remedies provided by the statute or may
impose any other legal or equitable remedy.' The broad remedies
provided by section 12.56 include the following: (1) the performance
or prohibition of any action;' 83 (2) the cancellation or alteration of any
provisions of the articles of incorporation or bylaws; (3) the removal
of any officer or director; (4) the appointment of an officer or director;
(5) an accounting; (6) the appointment of a custodian to manage the
business; (7) the appointment of a provisional director; (8) the
submission of dispute to mediation or other form of alternative dispute
resolution; (9) the payment of dividends; (10) the award of damages;
18 4
(11) the purchase of shares by corporation; or (12) dissolution.
This list of remedies is provided "to discourage ill-advised self-help
measures by disgruntled shareholders and the protracted litigation that
can often result" from disputes among shareholders of closely held
corporations.' 85

180. Coduti, 469 N.E.2d at 225 (quoting Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co.,
285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (II1. App. Ct. 1972)).
181. See id.
182. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(c) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1997).
183. See Jacobs v. Regas, 229 N.E.2d 487, 489-90 (II1. 1967) (holding that a
majority shareholder's threat to terminate a minority shareholder from his position as
an officer and director of a close corporation, thereby depriving the minority
shareholder of his right to participate in corporate management, presents a "sufficient
showing of imminent danger of irreparable damage" to justify temporary injunctive
relief); see also People ex rel. Stony Island Church v. Mannings, 509 N.E.2d 572, 576
(I11. App. Ct. 1987) (finding that a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction were necessary to stop an allegedly unauthorized seizure of control of a
church's business and religious affairs).
184. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West 1997). Dissolution of the
corporation is the most drastic remedy and any shareholder may bring a direct action for
the dissolution of the corporation. See Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 N.E.2d 51, 57 (II1.
App. Ct. 1993). The Kalabogias court stated that "[it is the rule that a minority
shareholder may sue the corporation directly for its dissolution if he can establish that
'those in control of the corporation have acted in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent' . . . [and that] [t]he rational underlying this remedy is to protect the interests
of minority shareholders against majority shareholders who 'reap the benefits of
ownership through compensation and other withdrawals not available to the minority."'
Id.; see also Murdock, supra note 63, at 440-470 (discussing dissolution and other
alternative remedies).
185. Thomas J. Bamonte, Shareholder Risks Lurk in New Alternative Remedies
Provisions, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 26, 1997, at 6.
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VI. APPLICATION OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

Pursuant to the enactment of section 12.56, Illinois law provides
broad equitable solutions for disputes arising within the closely held
corporation.' 86 In selecting a solution from the statute's available
remedies, the Illinois appellate courts have indicated a deference to the
trial court's discretion in fashioning relief to redress shareholder
grievances.' 87 Accordingly, as of now, there are no judicial
interpretations of section 12.56. However, in Schirmer v. Bear, the
Illinois Supreme Court established how the statute should be
interpreted.
A. Application of Alternative Remedies in Illinois
To reach its decision in Schirmer, the Illinois Supreme Court
analyzed not only the legislative intent behind section 12.55, but also
the statute's provisions for alternative remedies to dissolution." 8 The
court found that prior to the enactment of sections 12.55 and 12.56,
shareholders could not seek redress for wrongful conduct unless the
conduct justified the dissolution of the corporation. 8 9 The court
further stated that the "alternative remedies" statutes were "specifically
enacted to correct this problem by increasing the remedies available to
minority shareholders and by enlarging the discretionary authority of
the circuit courts to award relief in situations which do not warrant
dissolution but which do warrant some other, less severe remedy."' 9
186. Several states have enacted similar legislation to section 12.56. See Bahls,
supra note 6, at 312.
187. See Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220, 224 (II1. App. Ct. 1984) (stating that
the appellate court will not disturb a trial court's finding unless it is manifestly against
the weight of the evidence), overruled by Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill.
1996);
see also Swanson v. Shockley, 364 N.W.2d 252, 255-56 (Iowa 1985) (recognizing that
the remedy must not work an unreasonable hardship upon stockholders); Fox v. 7L Bar
Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 936 (Mont. 1982) (considering the public interest and
possible injury in deciding to dissolve a corporation); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551, 562 (N.C. 1983) (finding that courts must consider the rights and interests
of all shareholders and the effect of relief upon the existing corporation); Henry George
& Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512, 517 (Wash. 1981) (concluding that
trial courts must consider the benefit and the injury to the shareholders and must exercise
its equitable discretion before granting dissolution); Bahls, supra note 6, at 3 17
(arguing that some courts have sidestepped the difficult issue of setting standards by
arguing that courts should have broad discretion).
188. See Schirmer, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1175-76 (II1. 1996).
189. See id. at 1176.
190. Id. (noting that "the Advisory Committee perceived a need for [alternative]
remedies less Draconian than dissolution, whenever anyone sought dissolution of a
corporation") (citing Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State on the Illinois
Business Corporation Act of 1983, Section 12.55, Official Comments, reprinted in 2
CORPORATION
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The court added that requiring a disgruntled shareholder to prove
that defendant's misconduct was so severe as to warrant corporate
dissolution "defeats the legislative intent by severely curtailing the
discretion invested in the circuit courts to order the alternative
remedies."' 9 ' It further stated that requiring plaintiff to only establish
the predicate misconduct and not that such conduct is so severe as to
justify dissolution effectuates the legislature's intent to "increase
shareholder remedies while, at the same time, providing adequate
guidance for the courts."'"
Although decided prior to the enactment of section 12.56, Abreu v.
Unica IndustrialSales, Inc.,' 93 also indicates where the sympathy of
the Illinois courts lies. In Abreu, the Illinois Appellate Court
emphasized that the remedies should take into account the best interests
of the closely held corporation, and it enumerated several factors
probative to redressing shareholder grievances. 94 In that case, the
court applied section 12.55 to a closely held corporation where a fiftypercent shareholder brought a derivative action alleging breach of
fiduciary duties by the other fifty-percent shareholder.' The trial
court found that the defendant committed oppressive and fraudulent
self-dealing by establishing a company to directly compete with the
existing corporation.196 In result, the trial court removed the
oppressive shareholder as director of the corporation and appointed
a
197
provisional director to break any deadlock between directors.
The appellate court upheld the appointment of a provisional director
to the company as an alternative to dissolution. 198 Explaining its
decision, the court stated that "a provisional director is appointed as an
alternative remedy to judicial dissolution in times of corporate strife to
ACT ANNOTATED 429 (3d ed. Supp. 1984)); see also 8 CHARLES W.
MIJRDOCK, ILLINOIS PRACTICE § 18.21 (1996) (discussing alternative remedies to
dissolution in Illinois).
191. Schirmer, 672 N.E.2d at 1176.
192. Id.; see also Bamonte, supra note 185, at 6 (discussing section 12.56 of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act and its interpretation). Bamonte comments that
section 12.56 makes dissolution the remedy of last resort in order to make clear that the
complaining shareholder need not meet the high burden of proving that corporate
dissolution is warranted in order to be entitled to a less drastic alternative remedy. The
evident intent is to encourage courts to creatively fashion equitable remedies appropriate
to the unique circumstances of each close corporation dispute. See id.
193. 586 N.E.2d 661 (11. App. Ct. 1991).
194. See id. at 665.
195. See id. at 664-65.
196. See id. at 664.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 665.
CORPORATION
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help guide the company through crisis toward the goal of stabilization
and prosperity.' 99 According to the court, when appointing a
provisional director, the ruling court should consider "only the best
interests of the corporation" and should "use its discretion" in
choosing a particular provisional director.2" The court set forth the
following factors that the trial court may balance when evaluating
candidates for the appointment:
degree and quality of past involvement in the corporation; an
understanding of the corporation's history and current
situation; experience and abilities in providing a cooperative and
unifying element; need for immediate appointment; degree of
impartiality; and above all, a true interest in the viability and
advancement of the corporation as an entity ....
Given the infinite number of ways that business partners can
oppress each other, the Illinois statutory scheme is effective because it
is flexible enough to preserve the assets of the corporation, and
because, at the same time, it provides the disputing parties with a
framework that allows them to work out their differences.2° In the
event the differences are insurmountable, the courts are authorized to
M
dissolve the corporation and allocate the assets amongst the owners.2
B. Application of Alternative Remedies in Other Jurisdictions
Several states have enacted statutes similar to Illinois' that provide
various alternative remedies to judicial dissolution for a closely held
corporation. 2 ' An analysis of these statutes and the decisions that
have followed reflects the courts' efforts to balance the best interests of
the closely held corporation with the interests of oppressed
shareholders.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See supra Part V.B.
203. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(b)(12) (West 1993 & West Supp.
1997); see also id. at 5/12.30(a) (describing post-dissolution winding up of a
corporation).
204. States that have enacted statutes specifically for the closely held corporation
similar to 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 include Delaware, Maryland, Montana, South
Carolina, and Wisconsin. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226, 352, 353 (Michie 1991 &
Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4-603 (Michie 1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-9-501 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400, 410, 420, 430 (Law. Co-Op
1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1833 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1995). Two states,
Minnesota and New Jersey, have enacted statutes providing for alternative relief to
judicial dissolution for both public and non-public corporations. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West 1969 &
West Supp. 1997).
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For example, a South Carolina statute provides a list of alternative
remedies to dissolution similar to that of Illinois. 2 0 5 The official
comments of the South Carolina statute provide that the purpose of
listing the alternative relief available "is to overcome the reluctance
some courts have shown in the past to ordering anything other than
dissolution, or possibly a buy-out."20 6 These official comments
acknowledge that courts have broad discretion to fashion remedies that
are most appropriate to resolve a dispute and "what works in one case
may not work in another. '27 Moreover, the comments recognize that
detailed standards prescribing which remedy should be ordered for a
particular type of dispute are intentionally omitted because "they might
encourage litigation and also unduly restrict the court's discretion."2 '
The comments further note that:
although most close corporation statutes contain special
provisions . . . authorizing the appointment of custodians and

provisional directors, the number of actual cases in which
appointments will be the most appropriate remedy are probably
few. Usually the threat of an outsider running the company or
acting as a tie-breaker in a deadlock situation leads to a
settlement of the controversy.20 9
205. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-410 (Law. Co-op. 1990). Such remedies include:
(1) the performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of any action of
the corporation or of its shareholders, directors, or officers of or any other
party to the proceeding;
(2) the cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's
articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(3) the removal from office of any director or officer;
(4) the appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(5) an accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(6) the appointment of a custodian to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation;
(7) the appointment of a provisional director who has all the rights, powers,
and duties of a elected director to serve for the term and under the conditions
prescribed by the court;
(8) the payment of dividends;
(9) the award of damages to any aggrieved party.
Id.
206. Id. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 884, 886-87
(La. Ct. App. 1978) (refusing to order other relief besides dissolution for oppressed
minority shareholder); Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that the court had no power to remove a corporation's directors); White v.
Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (Va. 1972) (holding that dissolution and the appointment
of a custodian were the exclusive remedies available for rectifying oppressive conduct).
207. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-410 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
208. Id.
209. Id. But see Bahls, supra note 6, at 316 (arguing that unpredictability of outcome
discourages each party from negotiating a solution short of litigation).
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Similarly, New Jersey courts have interpreted an analogous statute
also as affording broad discretion to the trial court to fashion a remedy
flexible enough to accommodate the interests of both the corporation
and its shareholders." ° In Brenner v. Berkowitz,2 ' for example, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed the procedures to be
followed in selecting a remedy and found the remedy dependent on the
harm to the minority shareholder or the shareholder's interest in the
corporation.2"2
In Brenner, a minority shareholder of a close corporation sued the
majority shareholders, alleging that they had acted illegally,
oppressively, and unfairly in violation of New Jersey corporate law.21 3
The Supreme Court of New Jersey examined the state statute
providing for alternative relief to judicial dissolution and stated that
"[t]he need for such a statute was attributable 'at least in part, to the
fact that traditional principles of corporate law were often unsuccessful
at curbing abuses of power by majority interests in closely-held
corporations.' 2 4 The court stated that before a court may order
dissolution, it must weigh the "appropriateness of dissolution as a
remedy against the loss to society, if the corporation is forced to
liquidate., 215 It added that in weighing the loss to society, courts
should consider factors of loss due to the corporation's failure to be
sold as a going concern, such as the loss of jobs by employees, the
loss of a steady source of income by suppliers, and the loss of the
corporation's goodwill by the shareholders. 2 6 The court further noted
that courts must be cautious when determining whether dissolution is
appropriate because "'the statutory remedy was meant only to protect
210. For cases interpreting the New Jersey statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 12-7 (West
1997), which explain providing alternative remedies to involuntary dissolution, see
Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1025-27 (N.J. 1993); Musto v. Vidas, 658 A.2d
1305, 1310-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), cert. denied, 677 A.2d 1069 (1996),
and cert. denied, 677 A.2d 761 (1996).
211. 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993)
212. See id. at 1028-30.
213. See id. at 1021 (referencing N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:12-7(1)(c)). In Brenner, the
minority shareholder claimed that he had been precluded by the majority from
participating in the management of the corporation, and had received no notice of the
corporation's affairs. See id. He further alleged that the majority shareholder had failed
to pay sales tax on cash sales, failed to file tax forms for certain employees, and
misappropriated cash funds. In his suit, the plaintiff sought appointment of a custodian,
a court order for the sale of stock from the majority to the minority shareholder, and
dissolution of the corporation. See id.
214. Id. at 1026 (quoting Walensky v.- Jonathan Royce Int'l., Inc., 624 A.2d 613,
616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)).
215. Id. at 1030.
216. See id.
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the minority, not to provide a weapon to enable it to obtain unfair
advantage against the majority."' 27 Ultimately, the Brenner court held
that dissolution was not appropriate because the acts of misconduct
committed by the defendants neither prevented the company's growth
nor affected the minority shareholder's investment. 218
The Brenner case illustrates what constitutes extreme circumstances
sufficient to warrant judicial dissolution. By noting that "[t]he
existence of less harsh remedies [in the statute] has the effect of
increasing the willingness of courts to intervene and provide relief to
shareholders," the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that
dissolution is to be ordered only as a last resort. 219 Moreover, the
court acknowledged that suits brought seeking remedies other than
judicial dissolution are
very fact-sensitive, and thus any hard and fast rules are difficult
to formulate. The many possible types of relationships in close
corporations compel a flexible approach to the problem. The
statute intends to protect minority shareholders in the vulnerable
setting of a close corporation. Because the Legislature's goal
was fairness to all shareholders, however, courts must ensure that
minority shareholders 22are
° not permitted to use the statute to
tyrannize the majority.
Other New Jersey decisions also provide insight as to when a forced
buy-out is an appropriate remedy. For example, in Musto v. Vidas,22'
a frozen-out minority shareholder of a close corporation requested that
the court order the majority to sell their shares to the minority. 22 The
court refused to employ this remedy, stating that if a minority
shareholder's fair and reasonable expectations as owner of the
corporation are irredeemably frustrated, "the remedy is not to order a
resolution that frustrates the fair and reasonable expectations of the
majority," but to order the majority to buy-out the minority.'
217. Id. (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close
Corporations,138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1730 (1990)).
218. See id. at 1033. Although the court refused to dissolve the corporation, it
upheld the lower court's issuance of an injunction against any future acts of misconduct
by the defendants. See id. The court further noted that any future misconduct could
require the court to consider the appointment of a provisional director. See id. at 1034.
219. Id. at 1032.
220. Id.
221. 658 A.2d 1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), cert. denied, 677 A.2d 1069
(1996), and cert. denied, 677 A.2d 761 (1996).
222. See id. at 1310.
223. Id. at 1311. But see Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382 (N.J. 1996).
In Muellenberg, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a forced sale of the majority's
shares to the minority was valid where the oppressed minority shareholder was willing
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Although New Jersey case law clearly explains that the remedy of
forced buy-out is a drastic remedy to be applied only when alternative
remedies fail,224 a South Carolina case demonstrates a situation where
a forced buy-out may be an appropriate solution.225 In Hendley v.
Lee,2 26 the corporation at issue was exceptionally well run, profitable,
and had great prospects for the future. 227 However, the shareholders
of the corporation disliked one another and were hopelessly
deadlocked as to the appropriate managerial style for the company.2
The court acknowledged that allowing the problems among the
shareholders to continue could result in irreparable injury to the
corporation in the form of lost customers. 229 Thus, the Hendley court
examined potential remedies and held that dissolution of the
corporation was improper because of the continued profitability of the
business, potential for growth, and the shareholders' investments of
time and money in the company.20 The court held that determining
whether a corporation should be dissolved rests heavily upon the best
interests of the shareholders and that interest is "'reflected to a large
degree in the profitability of the corporation."' Accordingly, the
court ordered a buy-out of the corporation by the party with a greater
financial strength7. 2 Thus, because the court ordered a buy-out rather
than dissolution, the corporation was permitted to continue its growth
and prosperity.
and able to purchase the majority interest, was the most active in operating the
business, was the only shareholder employed full time by the corporation, received his
only income from his employment with the corporation, was responsible for
developing the corporation's contacts, and sought to preserve the business at a time
when the majority sought dissolution. See id. at 1389. The court affirmed the trial
court's order of the forced buy-out by the minority but acknowledged that this is an
"uncommon remedy." Id. at 1384.
224. See Brenner, 634 A.2d at 1033.
225. See Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
226. 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
227. See id. at 1322-23.
228. See id. at 1323.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 1324.
23 1. Id. at 1324 (quoting Gillingham v. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Co., 683 P.2d 895,
898 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)); see also Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929, 935
(Mont. 1982) (noting that in fashioning an appropriate remedy, the court should
consider benefit or detriment to shareholders).
232. See Hendley, 676 F. Supp. at 1326-27.
233. See Bahls, supra note 6, at 327. One commentator formulated the following
factors for determining the appropriate remedy to resolve shareholder grievances: "(1)
The remedy should maximize the ability of minority shareholders to realize their
reasonable expectations (2) The remedy should minimize the administrative costs
associated with resolving the dissension" between shareholders and "(3) The remedy
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DISSOLUTION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS BY ILLINOIS
COURTS

Frequently, closely held corporations that perform business
operations within Illinois are incorporated in another state. In the
event that disputes arise among the shareholders of "foreign"
corporations, Illinois courts are, nevertheless, empowered to redress
shareholder disputes within that corporation, assuming personal
jurisdiction is proper. Generally, courts of one state lack jurisdiction
to dissolve corporations domiciled in another state.3" Subscribing to
the general rule that a foreign corporation "should retain its legal
existence until dissolved by the state which has incorporated it, ' ' 235 the
Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that an Illinois court would not
have the power to dissolve a foreign corporation. 6 However, despite
the general rule, several Illinois courts have asserted jurisdiction over
matters involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation where the
corporation's assets, officers, and directors237were located and all
business functions were performed in Illinois.
In Continental-Midwest Corp. v. Hotel Sherman, Inc.,m a minority
stockholder brought a representative suit against a Delaware
corporation and its majority stockholders charging, in part, waste of
corporate assets and-seeking an order restraining the majority from
voting their stock. 9 Although the controversy involved the internal
affairs of a Delaware corporation, the appellate court held that Illinois
had jurisdiction over the matter because all of the actions complained
of occurred in Illinois, the corporate assets, officers and directors were
located in Illinois, and all corporate business was conducted in
should maximize the value of the economic unit while allowing shareholders to realize
value in accordance with their reasonable expectations." Id. at 320. The commentator
concludes that consistent application of these standards in fashioning a remedy would
help to protect the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders and to discourage
"majority shareholders from frustrating those expectations in the first instance." Id. at
338.
234. See FLETCHER Er AL., supra note 130, § 8579; P.G. Guthrie, Annotation,
Dissolving or Winding Up Affairs of Corporations Domiciled in Another State, 19
A.L.R.3d 1279, 1280 (1968).
235. Guthrie, supra note 234, at 1280.
236. See Babcock v. Farwell, 91 N.E. 683, 690 (I11. 1910); Edwards v. Schillinger,
91 N.E. 1048, 1051 (Ill. 1910).
237. See Voorhees v. Mason, 91 N.E. 1056, 1060 (III. 1910); see also ContinentalMidwest Corp. v. Hotel Sherman, Inc., 141 N.E.2d 400, 402 (111.App. Ct. 1957)
(allowing Illinois courts jurisdiction over Delaware corporation located within Illinois
because of the majority shareholders' undue influence with the corporation's dividends,
merger, and acquisition of common stock).
238. 141 N.E.2d 400 (III. App. Ct. 1957).
239. See id. at 401-02.
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Illinois. 240 Thus, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order
restraining the majority from voting its stock.24
Courts in other states also have indicated a willingness to dissolve
foreign corporations. For example, the District Court of Appeals in
California held that California courts may "assume jurisdiction of the
winding up of [a corporation's] affairs preparatory to a dissolution." 242
The District of Columbia likewise has stated that "[a] court of equity
has inherent power to appoint a receiver to liquidate a corporation...
where . . . abuse of trust is present whether or not insolvency is

likewise present., 243 Meanwhile, a Pennsylvania federal court has
exercised jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and liquidate and distribute
a foreign corporation's assets, 24 and a New York court has explicitly
acknowledged its having subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve foreign
corporations.245
240. See id. at 402.
241. See id. at 405. Similarly, in Voorhees v. Mason, the stockholder of a Delaware
corporation sued the corporation and its directors for the wrongful issuance of stock
certificates and the wrongful collection and retention of dividends. See 91 N.E. 1056,
1056 (III. 1910). Although the defendant corporation was incorporated in Delaware, the
corporate office, the corporate books and the corporate funds, along with a majority of
the directors, were located in Illinois. See id. at 1057. The defendants challenged the
court's jurisdiction. See id. at 1058. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Illinois courts
had jurisdiction over the suit despite the fact that the controversy involved the
corporation's internal affairs. See id. at 1059-1060. It should be noted, however, that
the Voorhees court held that the trial court may be required to interpret and apply
Delaware law. See id. at 1060.
242. In re Dissolution of Mercantile Guaranty Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 589, 593 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965).
243. Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (quoting
Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 1947)). The Illinois Appellate Court in
dicta has stated, "[tihe general rule is that the courts of one state will not interfere in
controversies relating merely to the internal management of the affairs of a foreign
corporation at the suit of a stockholder, and will refuse to appoint a receiver or dissolve
the corporation or divide its assets among its shareholders." Heitkamp v. American
Pigment & Chemical Co., 158 111.App. 587, 595 (4th Dist. 1910). However, the
Illinois Supreme Court recognizes that an Illinois court may appoint a receiver of the
property of a foreign corporation situated in this state. See Holbrook v. Ford, 39 N.E.
1091, 1094-95 (I11. 1894); see also People ex rel. Potts v. Continental Beneficial
Assoc., 124 N.E. 352 (I11. 1919) (holding that Illinois courts may act to protect
property within their jurisdiction from misuse, misapplication, or removal from the
state).
244. See Dallasega v. Victoria Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 697, 698
(M.D. Pa. 1942). "The question is one of expediency and of discretion rather than of
jurisdiction. This is all the more true where as here the corporation is purely a local
concern and rests its claim of being a foreign corporation only upon the fact of its
incorporation in a state other than Pennsylvania." Id.
245. See In re Application for a Dissolution of Hospital Diagnostic Equipment
Corp., 613 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). In Hospital Diagnostic
Equipment, a proceeding was brought to dissolve a Delaware corporation where the
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THE ROLE OF COUNSEL WHEN INTERNAL DISPUTES ARISE

When disputes arise among shareholders of a closely held
corporation, shareholders often look to corporate counsel for advice.
However, counsel for a close corporation cannot take sides in a
dispute among shareholders and cannot represent a shareholder or the
corporation in a dispute with another shareholder. 246 An attorney for a
close corporation owes a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its
shareholders.2 47 When shareholders are in a dispute with one another,
"the only ethical position for an attorney to adopt when substantially
identical interests which he has represented become divergent is to
represent neither the individual nor the corporation.'"'4 Attorneys
owe their clients a duty of loyalty, which is breached when an attorney
uses information gained through his representation of a client to the
disadvantage of that client, or when an attorney takes action that is
adverse to his client.249
corporation's only connection with New York was maintenance of a corporate office in
the state. See id. The court affirmed dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens,
but acknowledged that New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve
foreign corporations, stating, "[w]e have considered the litigant's remaining arguments
.. . that the courts of New York lack subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve a foreign
corporation, and find them to be without merit." Id. But see In re Application of
Dohring, 537 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). New York courts do not technically
have power to dissolve a foreign corporation, but may "fashion a remedy, short of
dissolution, which will attain substantial justice between the parties." Id. at 769.
246. See e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327,
331-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Woods v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 197 Cal. Rptr.
185, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that a corporate attorney for a close family
corporation could not represent the husband in divorce proceedings where corporate
asset is the key concern in order to avoid appearance of impropriety); In re Greenberg,
614 N.Y.S.2d 825, 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that corporate counsel may not
represent individual shareholders where those shareholders' interests are adverse to other
shareholders); Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that
corporate counsel for a close corporation may not represent one of two shareholders in a
dispute between the two shareholders in order to avoid appearance of impropriety); In re
Banks, 584 P.2d 284, 293-94 (Or. 1978) (recognizing that an attorney for a family
close corporation is in an untenable position if he represents either a corporate officer
or the corporation when the interests of the two diverge).
247. See Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, 181 A.2d 579, 583-84 (Del. 1962)
(recognizing that counsel for close corporation of three shareholders owes fiduciary duty
to each shareholder and the corporation); Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver,
Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
fiduciary relationship exists between counsel for close corporation and shareholders).
248. In re Banks, 584 P.2d at 292.
249. See Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.6, 1.7. See generally
Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 221-23 (N.D. II. 1975), (requiring
disqualification of attorneys from representing plaintiff shareholders where attorneys
previously represented corporate defendants in substantially related matters), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1976).
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IX. CONCLUSION
As this Article illustrates, the intimate relationships that exist among
shareholders in close corporations often break down and lead to
deadlock, oppression, or freeze-out. This Article examines many
instruments, including shareholder agreements, voting agreements,
and voting trusts, that shareholders can use in the pre-incorporation
stages to avoid such problems. In the event that these prophylactic
measures are not successful, the shareholders of close corporations
have recourse under law.
Illinois courts provide a sympathetic forum to address conflicts
among officers, directors and/or shareholders of close corporations.
In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly enacted section 12.56 of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act to provide a myriad of remedies to
shareholders subjected to oppressive or unlawful conduct. Illinois
courts treat close corporations as partnerships and, as such, impose
fiduciary duties on and among the officers, directors, and shareholders
of closely held corporations. The trend is clear that Illinois courts have
become increasingly proactive in applying the remedies available under
section 12.56 to redress the harm suffered by minority shareholders.
As a policy matter, this serves the public good and the private interests
of shareholders because it preserves the corporate assets while, at the
same time, it provides a forum for shareholders to resolve their
disputes fairly.

